The Australian Prime Minister, Scott Morrison, met with President Trump in Washington in September, 2019. At that meeting, Mr Trump initially signalled the possibility of a military strike against Iran, as the pair discussed the special relationship between the two nations.
The Sino-Indian relations have been constrained by the asymmetry between their threat perceptions: India tends to be deeply apprehensive of threats from China, while China appears comparatively unconcerned about threats from India.
Compared with China’s high-profile anti-corruption campaign, the so-called “tiger hunt”, India has been more impressive on promoting a clean government, based on data from the Corruption Perception Index over the past few years.
Even as the US threatens Iran with oil sanctions and war, China goes ahead with trade and infrastructure building there. Iran’s dependence on China highlights their shared interests against the US in the Middle East, Central and South Asia.
The goal is to provide a conducive environment for different streams of thoughts and cultures to interact and to transmit them to curious minds. Over time, this arrangement would produce new cultural-intellectual products as a result of ferment and cross-fertilization.
From the Chinese perspective, openness and inclusiveness are perhaps the most attractive points about the BRI. For the Chinese government, the BRI is a multilateral vehicle designed for those who want it for developmental purposes based on market forces.
In the last decade or so, Cambodia has moved much closer to China in almost every aspect, leading some to view Cambodia-China relations as a client-patron relationship. This relationship is widely seen as based on convergent interests and a basic “quid pro quo”.
New Delhi and Beijing have taken steps to find common ground in new areas such as in the information technology sector. The National Association of Software and Services Company of India has set up IT corridors in Guiyang, Xuzhou and Dalian of China.