In the run up to US Secretary of Defense James Mattis’ first visit to China from June 27-28, 2018, he said: “I want to go in without poisoning the well and do a lot of listening.” Well he certainly got an earful regarding the South China Sea. Indeed, it is hard to imagine how he could have expected otherwise, having already “poisoned the well” by repeatedly and publicly calling out China regarding its policy and actions there. Moreover, deeper political currents are running and China’s leaders are certainly aware of this.
Under President Donald J. Trump, the US has clearly stepped up its Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) and regular naval and air patrols in the South China Sea. Earlier this year, three US aircraft carrier battle groups conducted exercises there. But like a spike on an upward trending curve, the US has recently turned up the heat with a flurry of statements and actions. After officially identifying China as a “strategic competitor” and a “revisionist power,” the US began implementing a more confrontational policy in May. First announced that there would be “near-term and long-term consequences” for China’s “militarization” there. The Mattis-led Pentagon then rescinded its invitation to China to participate in the 2018 because “China’s behavior [in the South China Sea] is inconsistent with the principles and purposes of the RIMPAC exercise.”
Ironically, in doing so, the US “is cutting off its nose to spite its face.” China’s participation advantages the US military by providing it an opportunity to demonstrate its deterrent of technological superiority and to better understand China’s military strengths and weaknesses. This public insult was followed by a that targeted China’s maritime claims in the Paracel Islands, including Woody Island, a particularly sensitive military outpost for China.
Then, at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, Mattis that the rescinding of the RIMPAC invitation was a “relatively small consequence and that there are much larger consequences in the future.” He also asserted that China’s “militarization” of its occupied features in the South China Sea is “for purposes of intimidation and coercion” — a possible violation of the UN Charter’s prohibition on the threat of use of force.
Adding salt to the open wound, a draft of the US Senate’s annual stipulated that China could be readmitted to future RIMPAC exercises four years hence if it made positive changes in its behavior in the South China Sea.
On June 6, US nuclear capable B52 bombers overflew the China-claimed Scarborough Shoal. Intended or not, the fact that this occurred on the anniversary of WWII D-Day may have been interpreted as sending a “special” warning. The US is now reportedly considering by “intensifying” its FONOPs in the region and through the Taiwan Strait for the first time in over a decade. These statements and actions were issued against a background of rising US-China tension over the status of Taiwan and an incipient trade war. The US has labeled “fair” trade as a national security issue.
According to Jia Qingguo, Associate Dean of Beijing University’s School of International Relations, it is important to curb “a downward spiral in relations.”
China has responded in kind to what it sees as a growing US threat. For example, its Air Force spokesperson said that the landing of at Woody Island was training to improve its ability to “reach all territory, conduct strikes at any time and strike in all directions as well as preparation for the battle for the South China Sea”. It also undertook its own major in the South China Sea and around Taiwan, including a live fire exercise in the East China Sea that some saw as a warning to Taiwan, Japan, and the US. Moreover, it continues to enhance its “defences” on the features it occupies to what some say is an unacceptable level.
China is gaining on the US in soft power in the region — the capability to use economic or cultural influence to shape the preferences of others. Indeed, a major victory for China was the Philippines’ decision to put in abeyance the international arbitration decision in its favor against China, and to shift its foreign policy to a more neutral position between China and the US.
US policy and actions so far have been ineffective in making China change its policy and tactics. Indeed, short of use of force, China is unlikely to roll back its “gains,” and even in the event of a US threat or use of force it may well play tit-for tat over what it considers its right to occupy and fortify (“defend”) its sovereign territory. After repeatedly declaring that sovereignty over its territory — including its features in the South China Sea — is a core national security interest, for its leadership to do otherwise would be to risk its domestic legitimacy.
Indeed, when Mattis brought up the US’ South China Sea concerns with China’s President , Xi replied in no uncertain terms that “Our stance is steadfast and clear-cut when it comes to China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. We cannot lose one inch of territory passed down by our ancestors.” For China that includes Taiwan.
Some think China assumes that the US will not go to war with it over the South China Sea issues because the question of ownership of militarily indefensible flyspecks and the resources there is not a core US national security interest.
Despite US attempts to paint Mattis’ China meetings in a positive light, it is clear that the overall relationship is . According to Jia Qingguo, Associate Dean of Beijing University’s School of International Relations, it is important to curb “a downward spiral in relations.” He added that actions by both countries regarding the South China Sea and Taiwan were intensifying due to “suspicion and speculation.”
I agree and am not optimistic that relations will improve during the Trump Presidency.