In the run-up to the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s decision regarding the Philippines/China dispute in the South China Sea, China has been “reclaiming,” building on and, the US charges, “militarizing” unoccupied, and in some cases, originally submerged features. The relatively muffled rhetoric on both sides have led to speculation as to what is going on behind the scenes.
The four general military headquarters, Staff, Politics, Logistics and Armament, constituted the superstructure of the PLA’s central command system. After the restructuring, these four departments now have to share this prestigious status with 11 newly-promoted agencies and commissions.
China’s non-participation policy in the South China Sea arbitration case goes against its own national interests, as there are probably better ways to deal with the difficulties that China is facing in the South China Sea disputes.
The US has misjudged China, its intention and its role. It based its judgement on its own historical experience as an expansionistic empire and its deeply rooted great power ideology, and not on China’s diplomatic performance in the region.
The Brussels attack and last year’s terrorist attacks in Paris have the potential to sway the shocked governments of Western Europe to offer greater support for China’s ongoing struggle against Uighur jihadists in Xinjiang.
The discussion and debate on the South China Sea dispute has fallen into a deadlock between two monological contexts, generally between Chinese commenters and their counterparts from the US and its allies.
The issue of the greatest concern is Xi Jinping’s attendance at the Nuclear Security Summit which will be held from March 31 to April 1 in Washington, DC, as well as the Obama-Xi meeting on that occasion.
More than a month has passed since North Korea’s January 6 nuclear test, but no sanctions have been adopted, due largely to the differences between China and the United States over the severity, scope, and the very purpose of punitive measures.